In March 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) authorized the issue of an arrest warrant in respect of President al-Bashir of Sudan in relation to the alleged atrocities committed in Darfur. The request for the arrest warrant raised the issue of whether a serving head of state may rely upon immunity under international law to shield themselves from proceedings before international criminal tribunals. The decision was the first occasion on which the question of state immunity has been raised before the ICC and the first time an international criminal tribunal has considered the issue in respect of an incumbent head of state. This article will first consider the current status of head of state immunity in customary international law. It will then assess the applicability of the immunity of heads of state or government before international criminal tribunals, in particular the ICC, before examining the decision of the PTC as to whether the immunity enjoyed by President Bashir precluded proceedings before the ICC. Finally, the article will discuss the obligation of states, including Sudan, to comply with the Court's request for cooperation in the execution of the arrest warrant.
Introduction
On 14 July 2008, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) requested the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) to issue an arrest warrant in respect of the President of Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir. 1 On 4 March 2009, on the basis of evidence provided to it by the Prosecutor, the PTC granted the application in part and authorized the issue of the arrest warrant. 2 In so doing, the PTC indicated that it was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to believe that 7 The PTC found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that (1) a protracted armed conflict not of an international character had existed in Sudan since early 2003 between the Government of Sudan and various armed groups, 8 in the context of which unlawful attacks against civilians and civilian objects had been carried out and towns and villages pillaged; 9 (2) a widespread and systematic attack had been knowingly carried out against the civilian population since early 2003 , 10 comprising at least the crimes of murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape; 11 and (3) President Bashir was criminally responsible for these 8 Ibid., para. 70. 9 Ibid., paras.76-77. 10 Ibid., para. 89. 11 Ibid., paras. 94, 97, 100, 104 and 108.
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73 unlawful acts, either as an indirect perpetrator or indirect co-perpetrator, 12 by virtue of the control he exercised over the state apparatus of Sudan and the role he played in the intentional criminal policy. 13 In addition to whether the test for the issue of an arrest warrant had been satisfied, the request for an arrest warrant in respect of President Bashir raised the issue of the immunity to be enjoyed by a head of state of a non-state party to the Rome Statute in proceedings before the ICC. As the President of Sudan, President Bashir may invoke immunity from criminal processes in third states and possibly before international criminal tribunals. Although the request for the arrest warrant does not represent the first time a head of state or government had been the subject of proceedings before an international criminal tribunal, both President Milosevic and President Taylor were no longer serving heads of state when they were brought within the custody of the relevant tribunal.
14 Thus, the request was the first occasion on which an international criminal tribunal has been required to consider the immunity of an incumbent head of state. This article considers whether immunities under international law may be pleaded before an international criminal tribunal, in particular the ICC, and the significance of the referral to the ICC by the Security Council to this question.
The issue of immunity is relevant in two respects. First, there is the matter of whether the ICC was competent to issue the arrest warrant and ultimately to proceed to a trial of President Bashir. 15 The PTC found that the official status of President Bashir did not preclude his trial before the ICC. 16 Second, what is the effect of the issue of the arrest warrant on the obligations of state partiesand non-states parties-to arrest and surrender President Bashir if he were to come within their territory? 17 As the ICC has no independent power of arrest, it is now dependent upon either President Bashir to voluntarily surrender himself to the ICC or for states to execute the arrest warrant. If President Bashir enjoys immunity under international law, third states may be entitled to refuse to arrest him and to surrender him to the ICC. 
Immunity in International Criminal Law
The exact scope of protection offered by the laws of immunity, particularly in relation to international crimes, remains somewhat obscure. Unlike diplomatic immunity, there is no comprehensive treaty regulating state immunity and head of state immunity, so that the area is largely left to the provisions of customary international law. 18 In order to establish whether President Bashir enjoys immunity from proceedings before the ICC, it is necessary to examine briefly the rules concerning head of state immunity.
There are two types of immunity granted to state officials under international law: functional immunity (ratione materiae) and personal immunity (ratione personae). Functional immunity attaches to the acts of officials while they are in office. This type of immunity is limited, in that it only applies to those official acts carried out during the period of office. Officials may still be the subject of legal proceedings in respect of acts committed in a personal capacity, even where such acts were committed before or after their appointment. However, immunity ratione materiae will survive the cessation of office and, thus, may be claimed by former state officials. The second type of immunity enjoyed by state officials is known as immunity ratione personae. This immunity 'is conferred on officials with primary responsibility for the conduct of the international relations of the state'. 19 It protects the office holder in the exercise of their representative functions and is intended to facilitate the conduct of international relations. The rationale for immunity ratione personae is that the state requires certain state officials to be free to operate in the sphere of international relations, so as to allow the state to conduct effectively its international affairs and to maintain peaceful relations among states. 20 This freedom would be restricted if such officials were susceptible to legal proceedings before foreign courts, including arrest and detention. Therefore, the immunity enjoyed when in office is absolute, even in relation to international crimes, 21 23 However, as the immunity is that of the state and not the individual, it does not survive the termination of office. 24 Although the category of officials entitled to personal immunity has not been defined, practice and academic opinion suggest that it would include heads of state and government, foreign ministers and possibly others. 25 Personal immunity is, thus, one of the key 'procedural bars to the exercise of jurisdiction'.
26
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has confirmed that the immunity of serving heads of state is absolute and that individuals cannot be the subject of legal proceedings in foreign courts or arrested while travelling abroad for as long as they remain in office. 27 However, the Court noted that 'immunity from jurisdiction . . . does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed'. 28 The Court accepted an exception to this general rule in four circumstances. 29 First, immunities accorded under international law do not bar criminal prosecution of such persons in their own state. Second, the state may always waive the immunity of an incumbent senior official. Third, a senior state official may be subject to criminal prosecution once they have left office, subject to any subsisting immunity ratione materiae. Finally, and most importantly for present purposes, the Court suggested that serving heads of state may be prosecuted before 'certain international courts, where they have jurisdiction'. Providing only limited material in support of this statement, the Court was satisfied merely to refer to the relevant provisions in 28 Ibid., para. 60. 29 Ibid., para. 61. 30 The ICJ Arrest Warrant case concerned the immunity of the foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo before a national court.
76
Sarah Williams and Lena Sherif been the subject of extensive debate. 31 The implication from the paragraph is that the absolute nature of immunity ratione personae exists only in relation to 'horizontal' criminal proceedings before foreign courts, and may not be pleaded in 'vertical' proceedings before international criminal courts. This ambiguous statement has been the basis for some very definite assertions that immunity cannot be pleaded as a bar to prosecution before all international courts. 32 The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) applied the dictum in a decision concerning the immunity ratione personae of Charles Taylor, 33 finding that, as the SCSL was an international criminal tribunal, the immunity normally accorded to an incumbent head of state was not a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by the SCSL. 34 However, the ICJ's reference to 'certain international criminal tribunals' suggests that not all international criminal tribunals may exercise jurisdiction in respect of current heads of state. This statement is correct; it is not sufficient to remove the immunity of an incumbent head of state merely to assert that a tribunal is international in nature. 35 Yet, the ICJ provided no guidance as to the criteria to be applied, beyond referring to the three existing international criminal tribunals. The approach adopted also fails to take into account the different legal bases of the tribunals considered. 36 For instance, where a tribunal is established by a treaty, the international nature of a court does not, in itself, allow for the exercise of jurisdiction over nationals of a non-party state. 37 Rather, in order to ascertain whether a tribunal falls within the dictum of the ICJ in the 31 Arrest Warrant case, it is necessary to consider the nature of the court, its method of establishment and its constituent instrument. It must be determined whether the provisions of the instrument creating jurisdiction on the tribunal, expressly or implicitly, lift immunity and whether the state concerned is bound by that instrument.
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Immunity and the ICC
Thus, it is first necessary to examine the constituent instrument of the tribunal in question, in this case the Rome Statute, to determine whether that instrument has removed head of state immunity, either explicitly or implicitly. Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute provides: 'Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person'. This provision goes further than comparable provisions in the statutes of other international tribunals, declaring that procedural rules and immunities will not apply, irrespective of whether such conditions exist in national or international law. 39 Such procedural rules include all national regulations even if they rank as constitutional laws, and all provisions of general and international law. The article confirms the jurisdiction of the ICC in all situations, permitting it to exercise its authority without having to wait for a waiver of immunity. 40 Article 27(2) is, thus, an express removal of immunity.
However, it is also important to consider the method of establishment of the tribunal and whether a particular state is bound by the removal of immunity. The ICC was established by the Rome Statute, a treaty. Under Article 27(2), states parties have agreed, by ratifying the Rome Statute, to waive their right to procedural immunities under customary international law. As a general rule, treaties may only create obligations for states that are party to that treaty and a third state cannot be bound by the provisions of a treaty without its express consent.
41 This is reflected in the jurisdiction of the ICC, which is limited to nationals of state parties and/or acts conducted on the territory of a state party. Accordingly, the waiver of immunity contained in Article 27(2) has to be opted into and cannot 38 This is similar to the approach adopted by Akande, loc. cit., fn. 19, p. 418. 39 Similar provisions may be found in the Charters of the International Military Tribunals for Nuremberg and Tokyo (Art. 7 and Art. 6, respectively), and the Statutes of the ICTY (Art. 7(2)), the ICTR (Art. 6(2)) and the SCSL (Art. 6(2)). However, these provisions provide that official capacity as a head of state or government shall not exempt an accused from criminal responsibility. Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute contains a similar provision. Commentators have suggested that this provision is not directed at the removal of immunity per se. Rather, the provision is intended to remove the substantive defence that an official acted in an official capacity when committing a crime and is not a rule as to the applicability of international law immunities. 40 Immunity appertains to the state, not the individual, and it is for the state concerned to waive the immunity. 42 Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute and, as such, may plausibly assert that it has not waived the immunity of its President. 43 However, as a signatory to the Rome Statute, Sudan is obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, although it is debatable as to whether this would extend to a requirement to waive immunity. 44 Furthermore, the decision of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case confirms that a foreign state could not initiate proceedings in respect of President Bashir while he remains in office. In creating the ICC, states cannot do together what they cannot do alone (i.e. issue legal proceedings in respect of an incumbent head of state) and, therefore, President Bashir cannot be tried by a tribunal established by third states.
The parallel made in the Arrest Warrant case between the ad hoc tribunals established by the Security Council and the ICC is inaccurate. 45 There is a necessary distinction to be made between tribunals created by the Security Council and those established by treaty. The obligations on member states to cooperate with the ad hoc tribunals, 46 including the arrest and surrender of suspects, would be inconsistent with the obligation under customary international law to not subject officials of third states to legal proceedings. However, in accordance with the hierarchy established by the Charter, the obligation under Article 25 of the Charter to comply with a binding Security Council resolution adopted under Chapter VII would prevail. 47 This is regardless of the importance of the rule affected; 48 if fundamental human rights under relevant treaties can be qualified or displaced due to the precedence of the Council's powers under the Charter, immunity under customary international law may also be overridden, particularly given the 'constitutional' character of the Charter. 49 immunity with respect to officials of member states of the United Nations. This certainly appeared to be the presumption in the Milosevic case before the ICTY in 1999. 50 Member states can be said to have agreed to this removal of immunity and the possible surrender of their officials to the tribunals by virtue of accepting the legal framework for the protection of international peace and security under the Charter. However, the Security Council may only do so where the conditions for the exercise of its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter have been satisfied, that the tribunal has been established in response to a threat to international peace and security. 51 However, the same cannot be said for a court established by a treaty between two or more states. Since the jurisdiction of the ICC is based on the delegation by states of jurisdiction, the Court may not exercise its jurisdiction in respect of the head of state of a state which has not consented to its authority. 52 Absent an express waiver of immunity from Sudan, this raises the question of the impact of the Council referral on the immunity of President Bashir.
It is clear that the Security Council can confer on the ICC jurisdiction it would not otherwise have. 53 It has done this by referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC. 54 Another argument is that the Council has implicitly removed the immunity of President Bashir. The removal of immunity may be inferred from the act of the referral itself, the wording of Resolution 1593 and/or the wording of subsequent resolutions on the matter. By referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC, an institution that may exercise personal jurisdiction in relation to persons accused of committing the most serious of international crimes, the Council expected that senior officials, including those enjoying immunity under international law, may become the subject of an investigation. 57 Continued immunity for senior officials of the affected state would be inconsistent with the intended purpose of the referral. In these circumstances, the act of the referral itself would constitute an effective removal of immunity. Similarly, the obligation of Sudan to cooperate ' 60 or a reference to the applicability of Article 27(2) in relation to President Bashir. 61 Sudan has consented to this removal of its immunity by the Council by virtue of its membership of the United Nations and its obligation under the Charter to comply with binding Council resolutions. This is not, however, to suggest that the ICC is not required to consider issues affecting the exercise of its jurisdiction, such as immunity. It remains proper, regardless of the source of its authority, for the ICC to consider such jurisdictional challenges, as the ICC must in all circumstances act as an independent judicial body.
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There is another argument that has been used to justify the removal of immunity in respect of President Bashir. As Sudan is a party to the Genocide Convention, 63 arguably Articles IV and V of that convention have lifted head of state immunity where the accused is charged with genocide. 64 The ICJ has recently indicated that the ICTY falls within the scope of 
The Decision of the PTC on the Issue of Immunity
The previous discussion demonstrates the complex issues raised by the question of whether the immunity of President Bashir as head of state under international law would preclude his arrest and surrender to the ICC. What then did the PTC decide? The PTC dealt with the status of President Bashir as head of state in five short paragraphs. It concluded that President Bashir's official position 'has no effect on the Court's jurisdiction over the present case'. 66 The PTC based this decision on four considerations. First, it referred to the object of the Rome Statute, as stated in the preamble, to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes. Second, the PTC referred to Article 27(1) and (2) of the Rome Statute. Third, the PTC noted that the jurisprudence of the court has held that other sources of law referred to in Article 21 of the Rome Statute may only be referred to where there is a lacuna in the framework of the ICC (the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crime and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) and that lacuna cannot be filled by ordinary rules of treaty interpretation. Finally, the PTC stated that 'by referring the Darfur situation to the Court, pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Statute, the Security Council of the United Nations has also accepted that the investigation into the said situation, as well as any prosecution arising therefrom, will take place in accordance with the statutory framework provided for in the Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules as a whole'. 67 The brevity of the reasoning is somewhat regrettable, even though the PTC did not have the benefit of detailed submissions on this issue. Perhaps the PTC considered that the question of immunity will be revisited with the benefit of submissions from the accused should the proceedings progress. The relevance of the reference by the PTC to the preamble in this context is somewhat opaque. Indeed, one of the central aims of the Rome Statute is to end impunity for serious crimes. The preamble is not binding, even in respect of states parties. Perhaps the PTC is suggesting that any claim to immunity by officials of Sudan would be inconsistent with Sudan's obligation, as a signatory, to not act so as to undermine the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. 68 Or it could support the assertion that immunity for President Bashir would be inconsistent with the objective of the referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC, to avoid impunity for those responsible for atrocities. 66 Para. 41, Arrest Warrant Decision. 67 Ibid., para. 45. 68 Art. 18, VCLT.
The PTC refers to Article 27(1) and (2) of the Rome Statute as incorporating three core principles: (i) that the Rome Statute 'shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity'; (ii) official capacity shall not exempt a person from responsibility; and (iii) immunities or procedural rules shall not bar the ICC from exercising jurisdiction. As noted above, it is Article 27(2) that is relevant to the question of immunity, as Article 27(1) is directed to responsibility and not rules of immunity. The PTC purports to rely on this provision to demonstrate the absence of immunity for a head of state. However, it does not take into account that this is treaty-based deviation from customary international law principles and so fails to discuss the effect of the Rome Statute on officials of states that are not party to it. The reference to Article 21 of the Rome Statute is also somewhat confusing. Is the PTC asserting here that the ICC is precluded by the Rome Statute from considering principles of international law such as immunity? This would appear to be a peculiar interpretation, particularly given that the same principles of immunity are also referred to in Article 98 of the Rome Statute.
The final reason advanced by the PTC is the most convincing and is one of the approaches examined above. This approach suggests that where the Security Council refers a situation to the ICC, the state concerned is effectively subjected to the treaty-based regime of the Rome Statute, including the waiver of immunity set out in Article 27(2). 69 Sudan is treated as if it were a state party. As noted above, this does, however, raise interesting legal and practical questions. It also suggests that other provisions of the Rome Statute, such as the principle of complementarity, are also applicable.
Obligations of States to Arrest and Surrender President Bashir to the ICC
As the arrest warrant has now been issued and circulated, the second aspect of the immunity issue is now significant--the obligation of states to arrest and to surrender President Bashir to the ICC. Although it was established as an independent court, the ICC has no independent powers of enforcement and must rely on states to arrest and surrender suspects. 70 It is not likely that President Bashir will voluntarily surrender himself to the ICC. As the Rome Statute does not permit trials in absentia, 71 a failure to gain custody will result in the trial not proceeding. There are three categories of states to consider. First, there is Sudan as the territorial state and the state of nationality. As already noted, the Government of Sudan is under an express obligation to cooperate with the ICC pursuant to Resolution 1593, which would include the arrest and surrender of President Bashir. Furthermore, Article 87(5) of the Rome Statute provides that a state not party to the Rome Statute may be subject to an obligation to cooperate with the ICC on an 'appropriate basis', which must include a resolution adopted by the Security Council. Thus, unlike states parties, the Government of Sudan is bound by the terms of Resolution 1593 to cooperate with the ICC's request for the execution of the arrest warrant. However, it is highly unlikely that Sudan will take any steps towards complying with the request, given Sudan's previous failure to cooperate. The ICC has limited access to individuals in Darfur and interviews with witnesses and victims must be conducted in neighbouring Chad. Sudan has failed to execute the arrest warrants outstanding in respect of Ahmed Harun and Ali Kushayb. 74 Sudan has indicated that Sudanese courts have jurisdiction in relation to its own nationals and that it will not extradite or surrender any national for trial. 75 Sudan has previously announced that it will not cooperate with the ICC. 76 It is therefore improbable that Sudan will arrest and surrender President Bashir to the ICC, particularly as Sudan claims that immunity subsists. and indicated that it concurred with the African Union's initial response to the warrant in that it will impact negatively on the current peace process. 73 There are limited options to secure Sudan's cooperation. The Prosecutor has used his regular reports to draw the matter of Sudan's continued non-cooperation to the attention of the Security Council. 78 The Council's response was merely to restate--in a non-binding instrument-the obligation to cooperate with the ICC under Resolution 1593. 79 The PTC noted that, in the face of continued noncooperation, it may make a judicial finding of non-cooperation and refer the matter to the Security Council. 80 The PTC also referred to Article 103 of the Charter, stressing that Sudan's obligations under the Charter prevail over other international agreements. However, the relevance of this provision to Sudan in this context is not entirely clear, as Sudan is not likely to be under any other international obligation not to surrender its President. It is improbable that the Government of Sudan will react to this statement and execute the arrest warrant. Furthermore, the Security Council is unlikely to adopt enforcement action to secure the arrest and surrender of President Bashir. It has not done so in relation to the arrest warrants issued by the ICTY or the ICTR 81 and will most likely not do so in Sudan, given the sensitivity of the peace process and the opposition to the arrest warrant amongst African and Arab states.
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The second category of states to consider is that of states parties to the Rome Statute. The arrest warrant and a request for cooperation have now been transmitted to all states parties. Immunity may become a pressing issue should the ICJ and legal precedents by many European courts and even US courts': 'Sudan plans to undertake intensive campaign against ICC decision', Sudan Tribune, 5 March 2009. 78 Initially, the Prosecutor reported that a degree of cooperation from Sudan was forthcoming. However, in his sixth report, he indicated that the 'degree of cooperation . . . no longer exists'. In the most recent report to the Security Council, the Prosecutor reaffirmed the lack of cooperation on the part of the Government 82 The Security Council could utilize one or several methods to ensure compliance, including sanctions or embargoes, conditionality of aid, and, ultimately, the authorisation of the use of force.
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President Bashir travel to or through the territory of another state, or indicate his intention to do so. All states parties to the Rome Statute are under a general obligation to cooperate with the ICC 83 and a specific obligation to arrest and surrender an individual where a state has received a request to do so. 84 However, customary international law stipulates that a state arresting an incumbent head of state possessing immunity on its territory would violate international law. Moreover, Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC 'may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested state to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the state or diplomatic immunity of a person of a third state, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third state for the waiver of immunity'. The language of Article 98(1) recognizes that a state's other international commitments may override the duty to cooperate with the ICC. The provision is designed to avoid a situation of competing international obligations. 85 The best view is that the term 'third state' refers to a non-party state, thus Article 98(1) applies only to requests for the arrest and surrender of nationals of states not party to the Rome Statute.
86 Accordingly, in the circumstances presented by the arrest warrant for President Bashir, Article 98(1) would normally preclude the ICC from proceeding with a request for arrest and surrender, unless Sudan was to waive the immunity.
A state party presented with an opportunity to execute the arrest warrant must determine whether immunity prevents it from cooperating with the ICC's request or whether the referral from the Security Council, and now the decision of the PTC, varies the ordinary position. Article 97 of the Rome Statute provides that where a state party receiving a request identifies problems that may prevent it from acting upon the request, it shall consult the ICC to resolve the matter.
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The most likely approach is that the requested state would rely on the reasoning of the PTC that the referral rendered the statutory framework of the ICC, including Article 27, applicable to the referral. The requested state would conclude that it would not be acting inconsistently with customary international law if it was to arrest and surrender President Bashir to the ICC and there would be no need to bring the potential conflict to the attention of the ICC. Depending on the mechanisms adopted by the implementing legislation in the requested state, it is possible that the issue of the immunity of President Bashir may be raised in proceedings before the courts of the requested state, and the authorities of the requested state may take a different view of the immunity issue from that adopted 83 
Other Considerations
The issue of the arrest warrant has triggered a number of mixed responses as to whether or not the decision will render a peaceful solution to the conflict in Darfur more difficult. It also prompted the expulsion from Sudan of 13 humanitarian organisations immediately following the issue of the warrant. Several commentators are concerned that the issue of the arrest warrant may damage the already fragile 2005 peace agreement between the north of Sudan and semiautonomous south and perhaps reignite violence. 97 The support of mainly western states has added to the concerns of the African Union that the ICC is exercising double standards due to its focus on African states. 98 Others consider that the arrest warrant comes shortly after the signing of the memorandum of understanding between the Justice and Equality Movement and the Government of Sudan in Doha, and threatens to derail the peace process.
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Before the decision of the PTC, the Security Council was said to be considering whether to issue a request to the ICC under Article 16 of the Rome Statute for the 'investigation or prosecution' to be deferred for a renewable period of 12 months. Deferring the investigation or prosecution would address concerns that a trial in respect of President Bashir will frustrate peace efforts in the region. A deferral will require a resolution of the Council acting pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. 100 This step had been supported by a number 95 It appears that representatives of the ICC may consider this to be a necessary consequence of the issue of an arrest warrant. A special adviser to the Prosecutor has commented: 'UNAMID will not be able to carry out their tasks if it seems unlikely that President Bashir will resign; he may instead cling to power in order to avoid trial. Moreover, the effect of national amnesties on the jurisdiction of the ICC is not specified in the Rome Statute, although various provisions of the Rome Statute would arguably enable the ICC to support such an option if considered appropriate. 
Conclusion
The request for an arrest warrant in respect of President Bashir was a bold political move by the Prosecutor, which has been described as 'nothing less than a demand for regime change'. 118 The request raised difficult issues, in particular the immunity of heads of state of states not party to the Rome Statute, the nature of the legal framework applicable in Council referrals to the ICC and the relationship between the Council and the ICC. Other issues such as the obligation of states to arrest and surrender President Bashir are now relevant, and questions such as complementarity may need to be considered in the future. Even now that the arrest warrant has been issued, it is unlikely that a trial of President Bashir will commence any time soon. Member states and the Council will have to balance the benefits to be gained from criminal accountability against the risks to the peace process in Sudan. Officials in Sudan have to decide whether to arrest and surrender President Bashir to the ICC, to retain him as president and face increased isolation from the international community or to arrange for his resignation and departure from office. The threat of international prosecution may in fact have increased support for President Bashir both within Sudan and in Africa, while undermining confidence in the ICC and in particular the Prosecutor. Several commentators have argued that the most effective way for the ICC to proceed would be to accept that the arrest warrant 'can effectively be placed on hold for as long as the political climate for a voluntary surrender from Sudan is unfavourable'. 119 Instead, the Prosecutor should focus on securing the custody of other suspects accused of atrocities in Darfur, using sealed indictments if necessary. This would enable trials to commence, evidence to be presented and judgments delivered and would be 'preparing the ground for a politically palatable surrender of Al Bashir when conditions are right'. 120 
